A Generic Construction of an Anonymous Reputation System and Instantiations from Lattices

With an anonymous reputation system one can realize the process of rating sellers anonymously in an online shop. While raters can stay anonymous, sellers still have the guarantee that they can be only be reviewed by raters who bought their product.We present the first generic construction of a reputation system from basic building blocks, namely digital signatures, encryption schemes, non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, and linking indistinguishable tags. We then show the security of the reputation system in a strong security model. Among others, we instantiate the generic construction with building blocks based on lattice problems, leading to the first module lattice-based reputation system

On the Impossibility of Surviving (Iterated) Deletion of Weakly Dominated Strategies in Rational MPC

Rational multiparty computation (rational MPC) provides a framework for analyzing MPC protocols through the lens of game theory. One way to judge whether an MPC protocol is rational is through weak domination: Rational players would not adhere to an MPC protocol if deviating never decreases their utility, but sometimes increases it. Secret reconstruction protocols are of particular importance in this setting because they represent the last phase of most (rational) MPC protocols. We show that most secret reconstruction protocols from the literature are not, in fact, stable with respect to weak domination. Furthermore, we formally prove that (under certain assumptions) it is impossible to design a secret reconstruction protocol which is a Nash equlibrium but not weakly dominated if (1) shares are authenticated or (2) half of all players may form a coalition

Delegatable Attribute-based Anonymous Credentials from Dynamically Malleable Signatures

In this paper, we introduce the notion of delegatable attribute-based anonymous credentials (DAAC). Such systems offer fine-grained anonymous access control and they give the credential holder the ability to issue more restricted credentials to other users. In our model, credentials are parameterized with attributes that (1) express what the credential holder himself has been certified and (2) define which attributes he may issue to others. Furthermore, we present a practical construction of DAAC. For this construction, we deviate from the usual approach of embedding a certificate chain in the credential. Instead, we introduce a novel approach for which we identify a new primitive we call dynamically malleable signatures (DMS) as the main ingredient. This primitive may be of independent interest. We also give a first instantiation of DMS with efficient protocols

A Generic Construction of an Anonymous Reputation System and Instantiations from Lattices

With an anonymous reputation system one can realize the process of rating sellers anonymously in an online shop. While raters can stay anonymous, sellers still have the guarantee that they can be only be reviewed by raters who bought their product. We present the first generic construction of a reputation system from basic building blocks, namely digital signatures, encryption schemes, non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, and linking indistinguishable tags. We then show the security of the reputation system in a strong security model. Among others, we instantiate the generic construction with building blocks based on lattice problems, leading to the first module lattice-based reputation system

On the Impossibility of Surviving (Iterated) Deletion of Weakly Dominated Strategies in Rational MPC

Rational multiparty computation (rational MPC) provides a framework for analyzing MPC protocols through the lens of game theory. One way to judge whether an MPC protocol is rational is through weak domination: Rational players would not adhere to an MPC protocol if deviating never decreases their utility, but sometimes increases it. Secret reconstruction protocols are of particular importance in this setting because they represent the last phase of most (rational) MPC protocols. We show that most secret reconstruction protocols from the literature are not, in fact, stable with respect to weak domination. Furthermore, we formally prove that (under certain assumptions) it is impossible to design a secret reconstruction protocol which is a Nash equlibrium but not weakly dominated if (1) shares are authenticated or (2) half of all players may form a coalition

Updatable Anonymous Credentials and Applications to Incentive Systems

In this paper, we introduce updatable anonymous credential systems (UACS) and use them to construct a new privacy-preserving incentive system. In a UACS, a user holding a credential certifying some attributes can interact with the corresponding issuer to update his attributes. During this, the issuer knows which update function is run, but does not learn the user\u27s previous attributes. Hence the update process preserves anonymity of the user. One example for a class of update functions are additive updates of integer attributes, where the issuer increments an unknown integer attribute value $v$ by some known value $k$. This kind of update is motivated by an application of UACS to incentive systems. Users in an incentive system can anonymously accumulate points, e.g. in a shop at checkout, and spend them later, e.g. for a discount. In this paper, we (1) formally define UACS and their security, (2) give a generic construction for UACS supporting arbitrary update functions, and (3) construct a practically efficient incentive system using UACS

Issuer-Hiding Attribute-Based Credentials

Attribute-based credential systems enable users to authenticate in a privacy-preserving manner. However, in such schemes verifying a user\u27s credential requires knowledge of the issuer\u27s public key, which by itself might already reveal private information about the user. In this paper, we tackle this problem by introducing the notion of issuer-hiding attribute-based credential systems. In such a system, the verifier can define a set of acceptable issuers in an ad-hoc manner, and the user can then prove that her credential was issued by one of the accepted issuers -- without revealing which one. We then provide a generic construction, as well as a concrete instantiation based on Groth\u27s structure preserving signature scheme (ASIACRYPT\u2715) and simulation-sound extractable NIZK, for which we also provide concrete benchmarks in order to prove its practicability. The online complexity of all constructions is independent of the number of acceptable verifiers, which makes it also suitable for highly federated scenarios

Fully-Featured Anonymous Credentials with Reputation System

We present $\mathsf{CLARC}$ (Cryptographic Library for Anonymous Reputation and Credentials), an anonymous credentials system (ACS) combined with an anonymous reputation system. Using $\mathsf{CLARC}$, users can receive attribute-based credentials from issuers. They can efficiently prove that their credentials satisfy complex (access) policies in a privacy-preserving way. This implements anonymous access control with complex policies. Furthermore, $\mathsf{CLARC}$ is the first ACS that is combined with an anonymous reputation system where users can anonymously rate services. A user who gets access to a service via a credential, also anonymously receives a review token to rate the service. If a user creates more than a single rating, this can be detected by anyone, preventing users from spamming ratings to sway public opinion. To evaluate feasibility of our construction, we present an open-source prototype implementation